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Abstract:  
The paper identifies conditions under which ‘inefficient’ favouritism emerges as an optimal 
outcome even when the principal do not exhibit ex-ante preferential bias for any particular 
agent. We characterize how the optimal incentive scheme is influenced in the presence of status 
incentives. Using a moral hazard framework with limited liability in a multi-agent framework, it 
is shown that in presence of higher valuation for status incentive inefficient favouritism is more 
likely to dominate over fairness. Moreover, inefficient favouritism emerges as the optimal 
outcome when revenue of the firm is sufficient low. 
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1. Introduction 
Favouritism is undesirable but still is widely practiced within organizations. In recent times, an 
influential strand of research in theoretical economics has analyzed the role of favouritism in 
creating inefficiency within the system. In many of the cases it is believed that favouritism 
creates the foundation for internal office politics and conflict due to desire for power, which 
adversely affect the work environment. In turn, the productivity of the workers is also affected.  
The emerging literature on positive view of favouritism1 tries to explain the reason for existence 
of favouritism and finds that directly favouring an agent over others (more deserving ones) can 
actually evolve as an optimal decision rule to the principal. Most studies on favouritism, 
including studies in business and sociology, identify the individual’s personal preference for a 
certain agent (or a group of agents) as the primary source of favouritism. But in this paper we 
analyze the emergence of favouritism, even when the decision maker does not have any pre-
determined preferential bias. In addition to this we also examine whether status as an incentive 
reinforces the optimal emergence of favouritism. Thus, our analysis proceeds close to Kwon 
(2006) to show that favouritism can be structural also in the presence of status incentives and 
limited liability constraint.  
Often, favouritism is considered as an obvious outcome of subjective performance evaluation2 
which happens to be the best measure when objective performance measure becomes difficult to 
execute. Again, emergence of favouritism in the form of depriving an agent outside a network 
and thus, leading to inefficient decision making in the organization has gained attention in recent 
studies3. Unlike this whole lot of papers, this work provides the underlying micro-economic 
foundation behind the decision of preferring an agent out of a pool of two agents and analyzes 
whether the decision is optimal for an impartial principal. Similar to Kwon (2006), we assume 
that the principal observes the team performance of the agents. The principal can choose her 
favourite agent by delegating the decision right to any one of the agents. To ensure that the 
                                                           
1
 Few of the important papers in this area are Prendergast and Topel (1996), Prendergast (2002), Arya and Glover 
(2003), Kwon (2006), Bramoullé and Goyal(2009), Duran(2009), Chen(2010), Ponza and Scoppa (2011), Berger et 
al.(2011). 
2
 See Prendergast (2002) 
3
 For instance see Pérez-González (2006), Kramarz and Skans (2007), Bennedsen et al. (2007), Bandiera et al. 
(2009). 
  
 
favourite takes the efficient decision 4  the principal has to provide larger incentives to the 
favourite agent. However, under fairness, the principal provides equal decision rights to both the 
agents and then, to induce efficient decision the principal has to provide higher incentive to both 
the agents. Therefore, if it is costly enough to induce efficient decision then the principal would 
participate in favouritism from incentive perspective only. This is similar to the basic intuition of 
Kwon (2006). However, in addition to this, our work has introduced the limited liability 
constraint, which limits the power of the principal to punish the agents beyond a certain point, 
when the outcome is poor. At the same time, we assume that the principal has an additional 
instrument to elicit effort together with the monetary incentive, viz. status incentive. Thus, 
different to Kwon (2006), these features help in generating the intriguing result that in a 
symmetric model5, under certain situations, an ex-ante unbiased and rational principal would 
optimally offer a contract such that the favoured agent chooses her own bad project and therefore 
inducing the ex-post inefficient outcome to be optimal. 
The role of non-financial incentives (like status) in eliciting correct level of effort has also gained 
importance in recent studies in economics. Unlike the influential and growing literature which 
studies the importance of status as a non-pecuniary incentive to elicit the desired outcome6 our 
paper intends to analyze how status incentives interact with favourisitim, which has not gained 
much attention in recent times. We incorporate status in such a way that it is conferred to the 
team as a whole. But the valuation of the status falls when an agent achieves status due to the 
effort put in by the other agent. Interestingly, we find that when the principal ensures efficient 
decision taking by the agents, the optimal effort of the favourite agent is linked with the effort of 
the non-favourite. The favourite tends to free ride, by decreasing her own effort in response to an 
increase in other agent’s effort, till the level her guilt from conscience does not bite hard. At the 
optimal, the efforts are strategic substitutes, if the return of the firm and the valuation of status 
are low; otherwise the efforts move in the same direction. Therefore, in this paper a profound 
analysis of the interplay between monetary and status incentives and the emergence of 
(inefficient) favoritism have been provided. 
                                                           
4
 By efficient decision we mean that the favourite will push the non-favourite’s project when her own project is bad. 
It is explained in details in section 2. 
5
 The agents are symmetric ex-ante.  
6
 See Frank (1985), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004),Moldovanu et al. (2007), Brown et al.(2007), Besley and Ghatak 
(2008), Auriol and Renault (2008), Dhillon and Herzog-Stein 2009, Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010), Dey and 
Banerjee (2014). 
  
 
It has been shown by Rotemberg and Saloner (1994, 1995, 2000) that favouritism may not arise 
at all if there is no explicit cost associated with the act of favouritism or if the principal can 
optimally adjust the monetary incentives of the favoured agent. Yet, our paper shows that even 
after endogenizing both the cost of conflict and the incentive contracts, favoritism with 
inefficient decision making unambiguously overrules efficient favouritism. Unlike, Athey and 
Roberts (2001) we analyze the effect of the incentive contracts on decision-making and compare 
it with fairness to find that inefficient favouritism is likely to dominate fairness. 
The rest of the paper is arranged in the following manner: Section 2 constructs the model which 
is a modified version of Kwon (2006) in presence of status incentives. The benchmark case 
(observable effort) is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 provides the optimal contracts when the 
principal resolves the potential conflict among the agents either by indulging in favouritism or 
through fairness. The endogenous emergence of favoritism is also studied in this section. Finally, 
in Section 5 we conclude the findings of the paper. 
2. The Model 
Let us assume that a firm consists of a risk neutral principal and a team of two risk neutral and 
status conscious agents (agent1 and agent 2).The principal hires the agents to provide profitable 
projects (or ideas). The projects can either be good (), or bad ().7 The agent puts effort 
denoted by  ∈ 0,1 (where {1,2}) which can be taken as the probability of generating a good 
project. Therefore the project can be good with probability  and bad with probability 1 −   
and this is in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. The effort of the agent is costly and 
the cost of effort is given by  . If the good project is implemented then it generates a payoff  > 0 and zero otherwise. For simplicity, we can denote the realized projects by  = (, ) 
where {, }. Therefore, if agent 1 has a bad project and agent 2 has a good project then  = (, ). The firm is assumed to have limited resources and hence can implement only one 
project. 8  Each agent’s individual effort, project or whose project is implemented are 
unobservable and not third party verifiable. The principal can observe only the team performance 
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 The optimal mechanism in an organization with one principal and two agents has been studied by Baliga and 
Sjostrom (2001). But, different from our paper, the ideas are given exogenously to one of two agents in their model. 
At the optimal it is recommended to follow the agent who has the idea.  
8
 Sometimes organizations may also prefer to choose only one project to inject the sense of competition among the 
agents. 
  
 
which is the realized revenue, i.e.,  or 0. One common example of this situation is a company 
stock owner observing the increase in stock price of the company but not realizing which 
manager is accountable for the increase9.  
Since the realized revenue is verifiable, therefore the contract can be contingent on the revenue 
and can take the following form:  = { !", !#$,  %", %#$} , where !& ( '{, }) is the wage 
payment to agent 1 and %&  is the wage payment to agent 2 when the revenue is or 0. 
Together with the monetary incentive the principal offers a status incentive10 to the team of 
agents when the revenue is . But the valuation of the status differs across agents. If the agent’s 
own good project is implemented then she enjoys the status (0,1, but if the other agent’s good 
project is implemented then the valuation of the status falls on the account of guilt from 
conscience. Thus, the utility from status incentive for the agents whose project is not 
implemented can be expressed through the following function: 
                       ℎ(() = *+,{( − -& , 0} where , '{1,2};  ≠ ' and -0,1.  
If - < 0 it indicates that when the other agent’s good project is implemented then status is 
overvalued. This situation captures the free riding tendency of the agent. To fix ideas we assume 
that the agents do not enjoy any premium if other’s project is implemented. Observe that when 
& > 12 = 34 then the valuation of status reduces to zero. Therefore, the valuation of the status is 
positive only when the optimal effort by the other agent is lower than 12 .  
The agents also enjoy a non-pecuniary intrinsic pleasure 5"  when her own good project is 
implemented, while she enjoys 5#  if her bad project is implemented where 5" > 5# > 0,.  
Again, for simplicity we assume away the situation when the agent enjoys this private benefit if 
her project is not implemented. The difference 67 ≡ 5" − 5#  can be interpreted as the agents’ 
intrinsic motivation11. If the intrinsic motivation is sufficiently large then agents will exert effort 
even when there is no monetary incentive. However, even if the intrinsic motivation is large, 
each agent will prefer implementing her own bad project over other’s good project. 
Implementing her own bad project will fetch her 5# > 0, whereas, for implementing other’s 
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 See Kwon (2006) for more. 
10
 Status incentives may be are provided in the form of medals, trophies or letter of appreciation.  
11
 See Benabou and Tirole (2003) to understand the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. 
  
 
good project she gets zero.  Thus, truthful communication cannot be ensured with high intrinsic 
motivation and  5# captures the desire for power of the agent. A large 5# also indicates that an 
agent will promote even her bad project while denigrating the others.  Note that the principal 
does not have a pre-determined preferential bias for any of the two agents. Hence there is no 
exogenous favouritism in the model. We normalize the outside option of the agents to zero. It is 
assumed that the agents have no wealth, thus a limited liability constraint operates. 
Definition: Favouritism and Fairness 
Since the firm implements only one project and each agent wants to implement her own project, 
hence there is a potential conflict of interest among the agents. This conflict of interest can be 
resolved in the following two ways: 
a) Favouritism: The principal delegates the decision right (i.e., to select one project) to one 
of the two agents. Hence, the agent with the decision right is marked as the principal’s 
favourite. 
b) Fairness: The principal provides equal decision rights to both the agents. 
In case of favouritism, favourite chooses the implementable project in such a way that 
maximizes her own expected utility. Under fairness, if two agents agree on a decision, then the 
agreed-upon decision is implemented, however if they disagree then each one’s project faces an 
equal probability of being selected. 
Timeline 
There are two main stages in the game: (i) the contracting and the effort stage, (ii) the decision 
and the payment stage. In the beginning of the first stage, the principal decides whether to choose 
favouritism or fairness. Then the contract is signed between the principal and the agents. By the 
middle of first stage each agent chooses her unobservable effort  simultaneously, to generate 
the profitable project. At the end of the stage the projects are realized either good () or bad (). 
At the beginning of stage two, the projects are chosen (through favouritism or fairness, decided 
at the beginning of stage one). Then the revenue is realized. By the end of this stage wages are 
paid according to the contract.  
 
3. Effort Observable 
  
 
As a benchmark, at first we consider the first-best case where effort is observable and hence 
contractible. To find out the first best effort level we maximize the expected joint surplus of the 
principal and the agent, i.e. (, ). Therefore under the first-best the optimization problem 
becomes Max<, (, ) = ( +  − )  + 5"$ + (1 − )(1 − )5# + (2( − -) +
 (2( − -) − < −                                                                                                                  (1) 
When at least one agent comes up with a good project and it is implemented then the principal 
receives   and one of the agents enjoys the intrinsic pleasure 5" with probability ( +  −). If both the agents generate bad project with probability (1 − )(1 − ), the principal 
receives zero revenue and one of the agents enjoy 5#. When agent  exerts effort to produce 
good project (with probability ) and her project is implemented, irrespective of the quality of 
whether agent'’s project succeeds or not, agent  enjoys ( as utility from status, whereas agent ' (where , ' = 1,2  and  ≠ ') receives ( − -. To explain this a bit, if  = (, ) then agent 1 
gets (  and agent 2 gets −-  . This can happen with probability (1 − ). Again this can 
happen if  = (, )and agent 1’s project is implemented with probability . Adding these 
two events we get the required expression (2( − -). Same argument holds when agent 2’s 
project is implemented irrespective of the quality of agent 1’s project. Subtracting the respective 
disutility of efforts of the agents we get the joint expected surplus. The first order conditions are 
>?(<,)>< = (1 − )  + 5"$ + 2(( − -) −  = 0                                                                 (2) 
>?(<,)> = (1 − )  + 5"$ + 2(( − -) −  = 0                                                                (3) 
From (2) and (3) the first best level is  
@A = @A = @A = 3(B4)B(CBDE)F(3F4)F(CBDE)(B4)F(CBDE)                                                    (4) 
We need to impose ‘either’ of the following two conditions to ensure that @A ≤ 1.12 
Condition 1:   ≥ 1 + 2- − 67  and ( > - +   
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 It suffices to assume that | + 67| > |1 + 2-| for the second order condition to hold. 
  
 
Condition 2:   ≤ 1 + 2- − 67  and ( < - +  
4. Effort unobservable 
4.1. Favouritism 
To model favouritism, without loss of generality, we assume that the principal selects agent 1 as 
the favourite and delegate full decision right. We solve using backward induction. To start with 
we solve the favourite’s decision choice in stage-2 given the realized projects. Then the optimal 
choice of effort is studied in first stage. Finally, we derive the optimal wage contract. 
Due to the presence of intrinsic benefit, the favourite agent will always want to implement her 
own project irrespective of its quality, in the absence of any other additional incentive. But if the 
principal designs a performance based contract, such that the incentive payment is large then 
agent 1 may select agent 2’s project, if it is good. Suppose  = (, ), then if agent 1 implements 
her own bad project then she receives !# + 5# , whereas she receives !" + ( − -  if she 
implements agent 2’s good project. Therefore, if !" − !# + ( − - ≥ 5#, then agent 1 will 
implement agent 2’s good project. However, when  = (, ) then implementing her own good 
project fetches her !" + ( + 5" and !#  for implementing agent 2’s project. In this situation, 
implementing good project requires  !" − !# + ( + 5" ≥ 0 which is always true. Therefore 
other than the usual concern of effort unobservability (ex-ante efficiency) here, the principal is 
concerned with another type of efficiency which is whether the best project is implemented in 
second stage (ex-post efficiency). 
To explain this explicitly, following Kwon (2006) we proceed through a methodical proof and 
provide the following lemma which will help to characterize the optimal contract.  
Lemma 1 (Kwon, 2006) 
If  !" − !# ≥ 5# and  = (, ), the favourite agent ( agent 1 in this case) implements agent 
2’s project. In all other cases, the favourite implements her own project. 
Proof: See appendix. 
  
 
Thus, the principal has to decide about the optimal contract carefully such that the potential 
conflict of interest among the agents does not influence the favourite’s decision choice.  
4.1.1. Ex-post efficient decision 
Note if  !" − !# ≥ 5#, then the favourite will choose agent 2’s project over her own project if it 
is weakly better. Thus, if the principal wants to implement ex-post efficiency, she has to ensure 
that  
!" − !# ≥ 5#                                                                                                                              (5) 
Let us assume that !" − !# ≥ 5#. Then each agent’s expected utility is as follows: 
JK =  !" + ( + 5"$ + (1 − ) !" + ( − -$ + (1 − )(1 − )(!# + 5#) − <                                   
(6) 
JK =  %" + ( − -$ + (1 − ) %" + ( + 5"$ + (1 − )(1 − )%# −         (7) 
Observe that, since agent 1 has the right to implement the project, hence the expected utility of 
agent 1 and 2 are not symmetric. Expression (6) shows that, when agent 1 generates good project 
with probability , she implements her own good project and she enjoys the monetary incentive (!") together with the status incentive (() and the intrinsic benefit (5"). When the project of 
agent 1 is bad but agent 2’s project is good (with probability (1 − )) then agent 1implements 
agent 2’s good project and therefore enjoys the high wage (!") and status (() but the valuation 
of status is reduced by - due to her guilt from conscience. When both the agents produce bad 
projects, (with probability (1 − )(1 − )), then the agent 1 implements her bad project and 
receives the low monetary incentive (!#) and the lower intrinsic pleasure (5#) of implementing 
her own bad project. The disutility from exerting effort is subtracted from her expected utility 
function. The expression (7) shows that if agent 1 has a good project (which is with probability ) then agent 2 gets high pecuniary incentive %" and ( − - as the net utility from status. Since 
her own project is not implemented she does not obtain any additional benefit from intrinsic 
motivation. If  = (, )and agent 2’s good project is implemented and therefore she gets %" + ( + 5". Finally if both agents’ projects are bad then agent 1 implements her bad project 
and therefore agent 2 only gets %#. This explains the expressions above. 
  
 
Agents choose the optimal effort level by maximizing their respective expected utility. Thus, 
from the first order conditions of (6) and (7) we get the incentive compatibility constraints which 
show that effort levels which maximize the private payoff of the agents. 
>L<M>< =  !" − !# + ( + 67$(1 − ) + 5" + - −  = 0                                                   (8) 
>LM> = (1 − ) %" − %# + ( + 67 + 5#$ −  = 0                                                                   (9) 
The favourite agent’s optimal effort depends on the external monetary incentive (!" − !# ), 
internal private motivation (67) and utility from status ((). It also depends on disutility from 
guilt from conscience (-) when the favourite selects the good project of agent 2. Yet it does 
not depend on desire for power (5#) as the agent already has the power. However, in contrast to 
(8), the effort choice of the non-favourite agent depends on 5#, as the agent does not have the 
power to take the decision. Again, if agent 2’s project is selected then only effort influences her 
expected utility. Thus, when she optimizes effort it does not depend on -. 13 
Given this structure we can now put forward the principal’s optimization exercise to derive the 
contract. 
Optimal Contract MaxOP,OQ,RP,RQ,<, JST = ( +  − )  − !" − %"$ −  (1 − )(1 − )(!# + %#)                                      
(10) 
Subject to  
a) Limited liability constraints requiring that the agents be left with a non negative level 
of wealth :     !" ≥ 0, !# ≥ 0                                                                                                            (11) 
  and  
   %" ≥ 0, %# ≥ 0                                                                                                              (12)    
b) Individual Rationality constraints stating that for participation in the job it is 
necessary that the agents is offered at least their outside options (reservation utility) 
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 From the above observations, we can also reach predict the implication as pointed out in Kwon (2006). 
If 5# of both the agent are not identical and is such that 5# ≥ 5# then it is better to choose the agent 2 as the 
non-favourite since she would elicit higher effort. 
  
 
JK =  !" + ( + 5"$ + (1 − ) !" + ( − -$ + (1 − )(1 − )(!# + 5#) −
< ≥ 0                                                                                                                             (13) 
‘and’ 
JK =  %" + ( − -$ + (1 − ) %" + ( + 5"$ + (1 − )(1 − )%# −  ≥0                                                                                                                                                         (14) 
c) Incentive compatibility constraints ensuring that the effort levels maximize the 
private payoff of the agents: ∗ =  !" − !# + ( + 67$(1 − ) + 5" + -                                               (15) 
‘and’ ∗ = (1 − ) %" − %# + ( + 67 + 5#$                                                               (16) 
where ∗  ∈ 0,1 and {1,2}. Since the outside option is set equal to zero, which is sufficiently 
low, therefore participation constraint will not bind in this case 14 . The assumption of risk 
neutrality along with limited liability makes the incentive compatibility constraint costly and 
hence gives rise to moral hazard incentive for the agents. Also observe that !# ≥ 0 and %# ≥ 0  
are the relevant limited liability constraints and the other ones are slack constraints, since !" ≥!# and %" ≥ %#. 
Before we state the proposition explaining the optimal contract we need to make the following 
technical assumption. 
Assumption 1 
( + 5" < 1 
Now the interesting question is whether principal would choose a monetary incentive for her 
favourite in such a way that the decision is ex-post efficient or not. The following proposition 
provides the optimal contract design for the principal when the principal intends to implement 
the ex-post efficient decision. 
                                                           
14It is also possible, though cumbersome to extend this model when the outside option is high such that the 
participation constraints bind. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity we have assumed to the set the outside option to 
be equal to zero. For elaborate explanation of the application of moral hazard with limited liability refer Innes 
(1991), Besley and Ghatak (2005), among others. 
  
 
PROPOSITION 1 
a) If there is no limited liability constraint then favouritism achieves first best effort and ex-
post efficiency if 5# ≤ @A1 + (( − -@A) − (67 + ()  and the optimal contract is 
such that !"∗ − !#∗ ≥ 5#. But the presence of status makes it difficult to implement first 
best. 
b) If 5# > @A1 + (( − -@A) − (67 + () and the limited liability constraint operates 
then !"∗ = 5#  and !#∗ = 0 . The optimal efforts are ∗ = ( + 5" − ∗(( − -∗)  and 
∗ = 34 − FV(F3A)BW4A F7PF3$4A , where X ≡ ( + 67 + () . If  (X > 2  such that 
condition 1 holds then   34 , 2 = 34 and   increases with .  If condition 2 holds 
then 0, 34 and efforts are strategic substitutes.  
c) At the optimum the limited liability constraint binds and the expected utility of the 
principal, JST = 0. 
Proof: See appendix. 
The first part of the proposition provides the condition for implementing the first best effort 
under favouritism when there is no limited liability constraint. If all the agents are risk neutral 
and the principal can impose an unlimited punishment on the agents when the realized revenue is 
low then there is no moral hazard problem and all the agents will elicit their first best effort only. 
But to ensure that the first best effort also takes care of the ex-post efficiency issue we need the 
additional condition on desire for power to be sufficiently low. In contrast to Kwon (2006), here 
the first best is difficult to implement even when there is no limited liability constraint. With the 
increase in valuation for status or disutility from guilt from conscience it is more difficult to 
induce ex-post efficiency by implementing the first best effort. The logic is that status incentive 
partially reduces the burden on monetary incentive and hence (!"∗ − !#∗) is small. Therefore, for 
any given 5#, it is difficult to satisfy the ex-post efficiency constraint. The second part of the 
proposition provides the optimal contract when the limited liability constraint operates and the 
condition for achieving the first best outcome is not satisfied. Under this situation, it is optimal 
for the principal to set !"∗ − !#∗ = 5#  to guarantee ex-post efficient decision. Since, the 
  
 
principal’s expected utility function decreases with increase in !# , therefore principal sets !#∗ = 0 such that the limited liability constraint binds. 
The effort function of the favourite is dependent on the effort level elicited by agent 2. When 
0, 34 then agent 1 reduces her effort with the increase in effort by agent 2.  When  34 ,2  the effort of the favourite increases with the non-favourite’s effort. Thus,  =  34  is the 
critical point corresponding to which the agent 1 exerts lowest possible effort, 7Y = 5" +
(( 34 + 1) . The intuition behind this result is as follows: for the range of  0, 2    the 
valuation for status is non-zero. Till  =  34  the favourite’s benefit from status outweighs the 
disutility from guilt from conscience and hence the agent free rides. But the guilt from 
conscience start hitting hard beyond  =  34 and the net utility from status is falling, then there 
is a complementary relation between   and . At the optimal, if  (X > 2 , which implies that  
and ( are sufficiently large such that condition 1 holds, then ∗ > 34, this is because status works 
as a better incentive15 for agent 2 as well as high  creates greater motivation since %"∗ =  −
5#. However, when condition 2 holds, such that  and ( are sufficiently small then ∗ ≤ 34. 
The third part of the proposition states that since the principal cannot offer negative wage under 
any situation (as limited liability constraint operates) therefore the expected payoff of the 
principal is zero, unlike Kwon (2006). 
4.1.2. Ex-post inefficient decision 
An ex-post inefficient decision implies that the favourite will always want to implement her own 
project without even comparing the quality of the project with the one generated by the non-
favourite agent. To proceed in deriving the optimal contract with ex-post inefficiency we need 
the following lemma. 
Lemma 2 
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 As the “guilt from conscience” does not influence the effort choice of the agent 2. 
  
 
If !" − !# + ( < 5#, the favourite agent ( agent 1 in this case) will always implement her own 
project.  
Proof: See appendix. 
So, if the principal intends to give up ex-post efficiency and the limited liability constraint 
operates then the expected payoff of the agents can be written as follows: 
JK =  !" + ( + 5"$ + (1 − )(!# + 5#) − <                                                                 (17) 
JK =  %" + ( − -$ + (1 − )%# −                                                                                (18) 
The expression (17) shows that since the favourite implements only her project, therefore she 
receives the high monetary payment and status only when she produces good project (with 
probability ), otherwise receives !# + 5# . The expected utility of agent 2 is now dependent on 
agent 1’s effort only as her project is never selected as expressed in (18). From the first order 
conditions of (17) and (18) we get the incentive compatible effort level of the agent under this 
situation. 
>L<M>< =  !" − !# + ( + 67$ −  = 0                                                                                       (19) 
>LM> = − = 0                                                                                                                            (20) 
Since, the favourite implements her own project only; the earning of status incentive depends 
just on her effort level. Hence the optimal effort level increases with  valuation of status. It is 
also obvious that agent 2 will set her effort at the minimum at the optimal. However, agent 1 is 
highly motivated by her own intrinsic motivation together with the status and money incentive.  
To analyze the optimal contract under this situation we write the principal optimization exercise 
as follows: 
 
Optimal Contract MaxOP,OQ,RP,RQ,<, JSST =   − !" − %"$ − (1 − )(!# + %#)                                             (21) 
Subject to  
a) Limited liability constraints : 
  
 
     !# ≥ 0 and   %# ≥ 0                                                                                                   (22)   
 
b) Individual Rationality constraints:  JK ≥ 0 and    JK ≥ 0                                                                                                         (23) 
c) Incentive compatibility constraints: ∗∗ =  !" − !# + ( + 67$ and  ∗∗ = 0                                                              (24) 
The following proposition provides the optimal contract design for the principal when principal 
intends to implement ex-post inefficient decision. 
PROPOSITION 2 
a) When the principal indulges in ex-post inefficient favouritism then the optimal 
monetary incentive scheme is characterized as follows: 
) !" =   CFDEF3 > 0 and !# = 0.  
) %" = %# = 0                                                                    
b) The corresponding optimal effort level is given by ∗∗ =  !" + ( + 67$ and  ∗∗ = 0 
c) The corresponding expected utility of the principal can be written as follows 
JSST =   (CBDEB3)W > 0. 
Proof: See appendix. 
The limited liability constraint binds at the optimum as the expected utility of the principal 
decreases with the increase in !# and %#. The principal offers a positive wage to the favourite 
when the realized revenue is π. The optimal wage of the favourite reduces with the increase in 
valuation for status as well as her private motivation. Since, agent 2 does not provide any effort 
at the optimum16, therefore, it is wise to offer the non-favourite agent the minimum wage, which 
is equal to zero. The outcome is dependent on the effort put in by the agent 1 only. The 
                                                           
16
 Though agent 2 provides zero effort still we assume that the principal keeps this agent to avoid exigencies which 
can arise with a small probability and it is exogenous to the model. 
  
 
principal’s expected payoff, under this situation, is positive and it increases with the increase in 
level of return, favourite agent’s intrinsic motivation and her valuation for status. Thus, unlike 
the ex-post efficient scenario, the principal enjoys a strictly positive expected utility when she 
gives up ex-post efficiency. 
Hence, we can state one of the crucial results of the paper in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3 
In a symmetric model with favouritism, an ex-ante unbiased and rational principal would always 
induce ex-post inefficient decision of the favourite agent. 
Proof: From discussion above. 
For a given level of desire for power (5#) the principal has to provide higher expected wage to 
the favourite agent to induce ex-post efficiency compared to ex-post inefficiency. Again, since 
agent 2 also provides positive effort under the ex-post efficient situation, the principal has to 
provide non-zero wage to agent 2 to elicit costly effort, hence the cost for inducing ex-post 
efficiency is costlier to the principal, whereas under inefficiency agent 2 will not put any positive 
effort anyway and therefore the principal need not provide any incentive to elicit costly effort 
from agent 2. Therefore from a purely incentive perspective it is optimal for the principal to give 
up the ex-post efficiency and promote ex-post inefficiency under favouritism. 
4.2. Fairness 
Under fairness both the agents enjoy equal decision rights. If the agents agree on a decided 
project then that very project is implemented, otherwise each agent’s project faces equal 
probability of being selected by the principal. Since the principal focuses on fair basis of 
selection, therefore logically she would never want to implement an ex-post inefficient decision. 
This can also be shown formally with the help of the following lemma that random choice of 
project is strictly worse than favouritism. 
Lemma 3 
  
 
If the optimal contract under fairness is such that !" − !# + ( < 5#  and %" − %# + ( < 5# 
then favouritism strictly dominates over fairness. 
Proof: See appendix. 
Therefore, we proceed by assuming !" − !# ≥ 5# and %" − %# ≥ 5#. Agent 2 will definitely 
agree to implement agent1’s project if it is strictly better than her own project as it would fetch 
her %" ≥ %# + 5# . Agent 1’s decision rule also follows the above argument. But, if the qualities 
of the project of both the agents are equal then each agent would want to implement her own 
project and hence, either one’s project will face equal probability of being selected. Then the 
agents’ expected utility functions are as follows: 
JK [ =  \  !" + 5" + ($ +   !" + ($] + (1 − ) !" + 5" + ($ + (1 − ) !" +
 ( − -) + (1 − )(1 − ) (!# + 5#) +  !# − <                                                         (25)                          JK [ =  \  %" + 5" + ($ +   %" + ($] + (1 − ) %" + 5" + ($ + (1 − ) %" +
( − -) + (1 − )(1 − ) (%# + 5#) +  %# −                                                             (26)                                                                      
From the first order conditions of (25) and (26) we get the incentive compatibility constraints 
showing the effort levels which maximize the private payoff of the agents. 
>L<M^>< = (1 − ) !" − !# + ( + 67$ +  67 + 7Q + - −  = 0                                      (27) 
>LM^> = (1 − ) %" − %# + ( + 67$ + < 67 + 7Q + - −  = 0                                        (28)    
Therefore, other than 5# ,  67 the incentive of agent  increases with  -&, where , ' = 1,2,  ≠ '.                                                            
The intuition is as follows: when the guilt from conscience is high then the agent increases her 
own effort. High desire for power as well as intrinsic motivation increases the chance of 
implementing one’s own project if it is a good project.   
Optimal Contract 
Let us consider the following optimization exercise. MaxOP,OQ,RP,RQ,<, J[T = ( +  − )  − !" − %"$ − (1 − )(1 − )(!# + %#)        
 
  
 
                      (29) 
Subject to  
a) Limited liability constraint :      !# ≥ 0 and   %# ≥ 0                                                                                                   (30)   
b) Individual Rationality constraint  
JK [ ≥ 0 and    JK [ ≥ 0                                                                                                     (31) 
c) Incentive compatibility constraint: 
[ = (1 − ) !" − !# + ( + 67$ +  67 + 7Q + - and   [ = (1 − ) %" − %# + ( + 67$ + < 67 + 7Q + -                                       (32) 
In the following proposition we provide the optimal contract under fairness. 
PROPOSITION 4 
a) If there is no limited liability constraint then under fairness first best outcome can be 
achieved if 5# ≤ _`\FaE F4]FEQ F_` − (67 + ()  and the optimal contract is such 
that !"∗ − !#∗ ≥ 5#. But if guilt from conscience is sufficiently high then first best is 
not implementable. 
b) When the limited liability operates and first best is not implementable, the optimal 
monetary incentive scheme is characterized as follows: 
) !"[ =   5# > 0 and !#[ = 0 
) %"[ = 5# > 0 and  %#[ = 0                                                                    
c) The corresponding optimal effort levels of the agents are given by 
[ = [ = [ =  OPB3BDEBEQ3B(F4)BOPBaE  . The effort level increases with the valuation of 
status as well as with the guilt from conscience. 
d) The principal’s expected profit function can be written as 
  
 
J[T = b !" + ( + 67 + 7Q( + (1 − -) + !" + DE c d2 − b
!" + ( + 67 + 7Q( + (1 − -) + !" + DE ce ( − 25#) 
Proof: See appendix. 
The first part of the proposition provides the condition for implementing the first best outcome 
under fairness. In contrast to Kwon (2006), here the first best is not implementable if the 
disutility from guilt from conscience is sufficiently high.  
The second part of the proposition provides the optimal contract when first best outcome is not 
achievable. Similar to proposition 1 it is optimal for the principal to set !"[ − !#[ = 5# as well 
as %"[ − %#[ = 5#to guarantee ex-post efficient decision. The principal also sets !#[ = %#[ = 0 
such that the limited liability constraints bind. Since the agents face symmetric situation 
therefore optimal effort elicited by the agents are also equal.  Observe that the optimal effort is 
independent of  . This is because under fairness motivation is generated from the in-build 
competitiveness among the agents. Hence, incentives need not be linked with the outcome of the 
project. But the last part of the proposition states that though limited liability constraint binds 
still expected payoff of the principal is positive, unlike proposition1. 
Corollary 
If  > ∗ = f7QB(3BDE)3B(F4)B7QBDE − (( + 67) then the optimal effort of the favourite under ex-post 
inefficient favouritism is greater than any one agent’s effort under fairness. 
Proof: See appendix. 
Since [  is not influenced by change in return of the project, therefore when the realized 
outcome is sufficiently large such that   > ∗  then ∗∗ > [ .  But this is not a sufficient 
condition to conclude that the expected payoff of the principal would be greater under 
favouritism then fairness. For that we need to check under which condition JSST − J[T > 0. The 
following proposition provides the conditions under which the principal’s expected payoff under 
favouritism is greater than fairness. 
 
  
 
PROPOSITION 5 
a) For higher valuation of status incentive, ex-post inefficient favouritism is more likely to 
dominate over fairness. 
b) A critically low return of the project is sufficient enough to induce ex-post inefficient 
favouritism over fairness. 
Proof: See appendix. 
For JSST − J[T ≥ 0  we need ∗∗( − ∗∗ + ( + 67) ≥ [(2 − [)( − 25#).  When the 
valuation of status is high then the above condition is more likely to hold. An increased valuation 
for status helps in reducing the optimal monetary incentive; hence the principal’s expected 
payoff under favouritism increases. Since, under fairness ex-post efficiency constraints bind, the 
optimal money wage is independent of (. Therefore, under fairness increased valuation for status 
does not help in reducing the wage. Thus, if the valuation for status increase it is more likely that 
favouritism would dominate fairness. 
The second part of the proposition provides the sufficient condition to indulge the principal to 
choose ex-post inefficient favouritism over fairness. If   ≤ g = <∗∗^(F^) (> 0 ), then the on the 
event of success the net profit under fairness ( − 25#) is sufficiently small as compared to the 
net profit on the event of success under favouritism (CBDEB3 )  . Low return of the project also 
indicates that under favouritism the principal has to offer lower wage. But if   > g = <∗∗^(F^) 
then 5# should be large enough to ensure that favouritism is optimal. When 5# is large such that  
5# > 5#h = C −  (CBDEB3)i^(F^)  then it is difficult to satisfy the ex-post efficiency constraint. Hence, 
ex-post inefficient favouritism emerges as the optimal outcome. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we explore situations under which it is beneficial for the ex-ante impartial principal 
to indulge in ex-post inefficient favouritism in the presence of status incentives. Here, by 
favouritism we mean that out of the pool of two agents, the principal delegates one agent with 
  
 
the full decision right of implementing a project (which can be generated by either of the two 
agents). Ex-post inefficient favouritism arises when the favoured agent implements a bad project 
(preferably her own) when a good project is being proposed. We compare this situation with the 
fair decision rule, where the principal provides equal decision rights to both the agents, and we 
find that under certain conditions implementing ex-post inefficient favouritism emerges as an 
optimal decision choice for the principal. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature which 
captures the positive view of favouritism to show that under certain situations the principal (and 
hence an organization) is better off indulging in favouritism in some form or the other. Unlike 
Prendergast and Topel (1996), Prendergast (2002), Berger et al. (2011) we do not assume that the 
principal receives an additional benefit from indulging in favouritism. Rather similar to Kwon 
(2006) our paper proceeds to show that favouritism can arise even if the principal is ex-ante 
impartial with the important distinction that when valuation of status incentive is high the 
principal would always induce ex-post inefficient decision of the favourite agent. Together with 
that we also find that if the return of the firm is sufficiently low inefficient favouritism emerges 
endogenously and it dominates over fairness.  
This paper also, in a way, contributes to the influential and growing literature which studies the 
importance of status as a non-pecuniary incentive as our paper demonstrates that the presence of 
status makes inefficient favouritism more likely to dominate over fairness. When the valuation 
for status is high then the principal can optimally reduce the monetary wage and yet assure the 
participation of the agent. At the same time a sufficiently reduced monetary wage will ensure 
that the ex-post efficiency constraint is not satisfied. Therefore, under favouritism the inefficient 
decision is more likely to emerge as an optimal outcome when the valuation for status is high. 
Therefore, unlike other studies, this paper links status incentives with favouritism. By 
incorporating status incentive in the modified moral hazard framework with limited liability with 
multiple agents, we also find that under which conditions the principal guarantees efficient 
decision taking by the agents. We also find that, due to the presence of status incentives, the 
optimal effort of the favourite agent is linked with the effort of the non-favourite. The favourite 
tends to free ride, by decreasing her own effort in response to an increase in other agent’s effort, 
till the level of her guilt from conscience does not bite hard, otherwise the efforts move in the 
same direction. Therefore the model provides a rich analysis of the interplay between monetary 
and status incentives and the emergence of (inefficient) favoritism in a multi agent framework. In 
  
 
future, we intend to carry out a laboratory experiment to examine how the interaction of 
monetary and status incentives play out in affecting the level (and the type) of favouritism.  
 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
For ex- post efficient decision taking we need !" − !# + ( − - ≥ 5# when  = (, ). When  = (, )  then the condition for ex-post efficiency becomes !" − !# + ( + 5" ≥ 0, which is 
always true. Observe, !" − !# ≥ 5#  ensures that !" − !# + ( − - ≥ 5# , since ( − - ≥0. Thus, if !" − !# ≥ 5#, it is sufficient to guarantee ex- post efficiency in decision taking. 
QED. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
(a) If there is no limited liability constraint and the ex-post efficiency constraint !" − !# ≥5# is non- binding the principal will implement the first best outcome as the agents are risk 
neutral. To enforce first best effort principal would set !"∗ − !#∗ = _`jF7QB 3F4_`$kF(3BDE)F_`  
from (8) and %"∗ − %#∗ = _`F_` − (5" + () from (9). To satisfy the ex-post efficiency constraint 
we need _`jF7QB 3F4_`$kF(3BDE)F_` ≥ 5#. Therefore, after simplification we can write that if  5# ≤ @A1 + (( − -@A) − (67 + () then only the principal can induce first best outcome. 
Observe that >lm?>3 = @A − 1 < 0  and >lm?>4 = −@A < 0 , therefore the presence of status 
incentive makes it difficult to implement first best outcome.QED. 
(b) Now if 5# > @A1 + (( − -@A) − (67 + ()  and the limited liability constraint 
operates then first best outcome is not implementable. Under this situation to ensure ex-post 
efficiency it is optimal for the principal to set !"∗ − !#∗ = 5# . Substituting this in (15) we get 
 =  ( + 5"$ − (( − -).  It is straightforward to show that at  = 34 ,   reaches its 
minimum. Thus the relation between and  can be depicted with the help of the following 
diagram. 
                                    
  
 
 
 
                     ( + 5" 
    5" +  (( 34 + 1) 
 
                             O          
                      (2-                           (- = 2    
Fig: 1: Relationship between efforts 
When eϵ0, pq the net utility from status ϵp , θ, whereas if eϵ pq , 2  then the net utility from 
status lies between 0  and p. Therefore, with the increase in e , e  falls till 34  and increases 
thereafter as the guilt from conscience dominates in that range. Substituting  =  ( + 5"$ −(( − -) in the objective function of the principal and solving for  yields %"∗ − %#∗ =  −5# . Substituting these expressions in the binding incentive compatibility constraint (16) we get -eX + (1 − (X)e −  1 − ( + 5"$X = 0 , where X ≡  + 67 + (.  We can solve for the 
positive root of the equation to find  ∗ = 34 − FV(F3A)BW4A F7PF3$4A  ≥ 0 (which is ensured 
by assumption 1.)Now, if (X((X − 2) + 4-X 1 − 5" − ($ > 0  then ∗ > 34.  This happens   
(i) if (X > 2 or (ii) if (X < 2 and 4-X 1 − 5" − ($ > ((2 − (X). From condition 1 we get 2( ≥ 1 + 2-, i.e., (1 + 2-) can maximum be equal to 2(. Substituting this to the other part of 
the condition 1 we get  ≥ 2( − 67. For ( = 1 , we get  + 67 ≥ 2 , which indicates that ( + 67 + () ≥ 2. Therefore, if (i) holds, it indicates that  and ( is sufficiently large, which 
takes care of condition 1. Similarly from condition 2 we can deduce( + 67 + () < 2, which 
implies  (( + 67 + () < 2.Therefore, if condition 2 holds than (X < 2. But for (ii) to hold we 
also need 4-X 1 − 5" − ($ > ((2 − (X).  If ( 5" + () → 1  such that assumption 1 is also 
valid, then the above two inequalities are mutually inconsistent. Thus, to avoid complexities we 
  
 
rule out this situation as 4-X 1 − 5" − ($ > ((2 − (X)  is not universally true for all range of 
values when (X < 2.  Hence, when  and ( are sufficiently low such that condition 2 holds then  
(X < 2. Now if, 4-X 1 − 5" − ($ ≤ ((2 − (X)  then ∗ ≥ 34. QED. 
(c) The expected payoff of the principal can be written as JST = ( +  − ) − (!" −!#) − (%" − %#) − (!# + %#).Since JST reduces with !# and %#  hence it is optimal for the 
principal to offer the minimum possible wage when the outcome is bad. Thus, the limited 
liability constraints bind at the optimum. Substituting the optimal values of (!"∗ − !#∗) and (%"∗ − %#∗) in the objective function we find the expected utility of the principal under this 
situation is zero.QED. 
Proof Lemma 2 
The decision of the favourite is ex-post inefficient if !" − !# + ( − - < 5# . Now, if !" − !# + ( < 5#  then definitely !" − !# + ( − - < 5# , since - ≥ 0 . Therefore, !" − !# + ( < 5#is the sufficient condition to introduce ex-post inefficient decision taking in 
the model. QED. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The incentive compatibility constraints provide the optimal effort levels. Substituting ∗∗ =
!" − !# + ( + 67  in expected utility of the favourite we get !# = − u5# + < v < 0.  Since 
limited liability constraints operate, hence the principal cannot punish the agent by offering 
negative wage. At best the principal can offer zero bonus to the agent when the outcome of the 
project is bad. From (20) we find that agent 2 put in no effort, hence the principal offers just the 
minimum bonus (zero) under both good and bad outcome. From (19) we can write !" =  −
67 − ( . Plugging this in the objective function and solving for ,  we get ∗∗ = CBDEB3 . 
Therefore, !"∗∗ = CFDEF3  and JSST = (CBDEB3)W . QED. 
Proof of Lemma 3 
If !" − !# + ( < 5# and %" − %# + ( < 5# then each agent would like to implement her own 
project. Under fairness, the project is selected with equal probability. To examine whether 
choosing the project with equal probability is optimal or not we perform the following exercise. 
  
 
We assume that agent1’s project is selected with probability w, where 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. The expected 
utility of the agents can be written as 
JK [ = wj !" + ( + 5"$ + (1 − )(!# + 5#)k + (1 − w) !" + ( − -$
+ (1 − )!# − 2  
 JK [ = wj %" + ( − -$ + (1 − )%#k + (1 − w) %" + ( + 5"$ + (1 − )(%# + 5#)  
−  2  
The incentive compatibility constraints are >L<M^>< = 0 =>  [ = w !" − !#$ + 67 + (  and 
>LM^> = 0 =>  [ = (1 − w) %" − %#$ + 67 + (.Since the agents are identical, therefore at 
the optimum  !" − !#$ =  (%" − %#)  = z (say). Then the principal’s expected payoff is J[T = ( +  − )j −  !" − !#$ −  %" − %#$k − (!# + %#).   Since J[T  falls with   !# 
and %#. Therefore, limited liability constraints bind at the optimum and !# = %# = 0. We can 
rewrite the reduced form of the principal’s objective function as  J[T = ( − 2x)(x + 67 +
()(2w − 2w + 1). From the FOC we get the >Ly^>z = 0 => w = . The SOC indicates that at 
w =  the principal’s objective function reaches miminum since >Ly^>z = 4 ( − 2x)(x + 67 +
() > 0 if ( − 2x) > 0. It can be easily checked that  ( − 2x) = ({BDEB3)(Fz)Bzz(Fz)  >0. Now, 
since there are no other interior points of optimum, therefore we consider the corner points to 
find |J[T}z~, = ( − 2x)(x + 67 + () and |J[T}z~< = (CF{)i (x + 67 + (). Thus, the expected 
profit function attains maxima at w = 0,1. When w = 1 it implies that the principal is favouring 
agent 1 and when w = 0  the agent 2 is favoured. Thus, fairness is strictly worse than 
favouritism.QED. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
  
 
The incentive compatibility constraints provide the optimal efforts. Solving (27) and (28) we get 
[ = [ = [ =  OPB3BDEBEQ3B(F4)BOPBaE  . >^>3 = 22(1−-)−65−5(65+2(1+(−-+!))2 = 22(1−-)−5(65+2(1+(−-+!))2 > 0,  by 
assumption 1. Again, 4 = 3BDEBEQ BOP(B3F4BaE BOP) > 0. Now if there is no limited liability and  !"[ =
_`uFaE F4vFEQF_` − (( + 67) then principal can ensure that [ = @A . For the ex-post efficiency 
constraint to be satisfied we need  5# ≤ (F4)_`F3 F_`$FDEF_` FEQF_` . It is easy to say that 
for higher value of -, this inequality will not hold, as 5# > 0 by model specification. Now, if 
first best is not implementable and limited liability constraints operate then to ensure ex-post 
efficiency the constraint will bind. At the optimum the limited liability constraints will also bind 
as the principal profit decrease with increase in !#  and %# .  Thus !"[ = %"[ = 5#  and [ =
 f7QB(3BDE)3B(F4)B7QBDE. Substituting the optimal values of all the variables we get the reduced form 
of the principal’s expected profit function. QED. 
Proof of Corollary 
Comparing [ with ∗∗  we find that if  ≥ f7QB(3BDE)3B(F4)B7QBDE − 67 − (   then ∗∗ ≥ [ . 
If 5#<(3BDE)FDEF(3F4)fF(3BDE)  then the above condition is redundant and ∗∗ is always greater than 
[ . But, going by the model specifications, (3BDE)DEF(B4F3)fF(3BDE) < 0. Thus, we require  to be 
large for  ∗∗ ≥ [ . QED. 
Proof of Proposition 5 
(a)  For JSST − J[T > 0 we need ∗∗( − ∗∗ + ( + 67) > [(2 − [)( − 25#).  Though the 
optimal effort ∗∗  and [  are functions of (  but by applying envelope theorem we can 
concentrate  only on the direct effect of ( on the LHS of the condition to find >lm?>3 = ∗∗ ≥ 0. 
Similar application of envelope theorem on RHS yields >m?>3 = 0. Thus, >lm?>3 ≥ >m?>3 . QED. 
  
 
(b) After simplification of the above condition we get the condition as 5# > C − (CB3BDE)i^ F^$ . 
Now, if C ≤ (CB3BDE)i^ F^$ , i.e.,  ≤ <∗∗^ F^$ > 0 then it is a sufficient condition to ensure  JSST >J[T .QED. 
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